Do Individuals or Firms Matter More? The Case of Patent Generation by Liu, Tong et al.
Cornell University School of Hotel Administration 
The Scholarly Commons 
Working Papers School of Hotel Administration Collection 
4-2016 
Do Individuals or Firms Matter More? The Case of Patent 
Generation 
Tong Liu 
Peking University 
Yifei Mao Ph.D. 
Cornell University School of Hotel Administration, ym355@cornell.edu 
Xuan Tian 
Indiana University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/workingpapers 
 Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Liu, T., Mao, Y., & Tian, X. (2016). Do individuals or firms matter more? The case of patent generation 
[Electronic version]. Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell University, SHA School site: 
http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/workingpapers/22 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Hotel Administration Collection at 
The Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Working Papers by an authorized administrator of 
The Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact hotellibrary@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Do Individuals or Firms Matter More? The Case of Patent Generation 
Abstract 
This paper studies the relative importance of individual inventors’ human capital and firms’ organizational 
capital in promoting a firm’s innovation output. We decompose the variation in innovation output into 
inventor- and firm-specific components. Inventors’ human capital is about 13 times as important as firms’ 
organizational capital in explaining a firm’s innovation performance in terms of patent counts and 
citations, while inventors’ human capital is only about the same as important when explaining the firm’s 
innovation styles in terms of patent exploratory and exploitive scores. In the cross section, inventors 
contribute more to innovation output when they are better networked, in firms with higher inventor 
mobility, in industries in which innovation is more difficult to achieve, and in publicly traded firms. 
Additional tests suggest that our main findings continue to hold after accounting for inventors’ 
endogenous moving. This paper highlights the importance of individual inventors in enhancing firm 
innovation and sheds new light on the theory of the firm. 
Keywords 
organizational capital, human capital, firms, inventors, innovation 
Disciplines 
Corporate Finance | Finance and Financial Management 
Comments 
Required Publisher Statement 
Copyright held by the authors. 
This working paper is available at The Scholarly Commons: https://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/workingpapers/22 
  
 
Do Individuals or Firms Matter More? The Case of Patent Generation 
 
 
 
 
 
Tong Liu 
Peking University 
liutongccer@pku.edu.cn 
(86) 10-62751475 
 
 
Yifei Mao 
Cornell University 
ym355@cornell.edu 
  607-255-8140 
 
 
Xuan Tian 
Indiana University and Tsinghua University 
tianx@indiana.edu 
            812-855-3420 
 
 
 
 
This version: April, 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*We are grateful for the comments and suggestions from Linda Canina, Andrew Ellul, Andrew Karolyi, Pam 
Moulton, Veronica Pool, Noah Stoffman, Scott Yonker, and seminar participants at Indiana University and Cornell 
University. We alone are responsible for any errors or omissions. 
 
 
Do individuals or firms matter more? The case of patent generation 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper studies the relative importance of individual inventors’ human capital and firms’ 
organizational capital in promoting a firm’s innovation output. We decompose the variation in 
innovation output into inventor- and firm-specific components. Inventors’ human capital is about 
13 times as important as firms’ organizational capital in explaining a firm’s innovation 
performance in terms of patent counts and citations, while inventors’ human capital is only about 
the same as important when explaining the firm’s innovation styles in terms of patent exploratory 
and exploitive scores. In the cross section, inventors contribute more to innovation output when 
they are better networked, in firms with higher inventor mobility, in industries in which 
innovation is more difficult to achieve, and in publicly traded firms. Additional tests suggest that 
our main findings continue to hold after accounting for inventors’ endogenous moving. This 
paper highlights the importance of individual inventors in enhancing firm innovation and sheds 
new light on the theory of the firm. 
 
 
 
Key words: Organizational capital, Human capital, Firms, Inventors, Innovation 
 
JEL number: G30, G32, O32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 1. Introduction 
Since Coase (1937), there has been a longstanding debate on what constitutes a firm. On 
the one hand, in the Hart-Moore framework, nonhuman assets are the glue that brings a firm 
together (Hart (1995)). On the other hand, Zingales (2000) argues that “human capital is 
emerging as the most crucial asset” in today’s world. It is still unclear to researchers, however, 
what role a firm’s organizational capital and its human capital play in explaining a firm’s long-
run success. Is the growth engine of a firm embedded in its human capital or non-human capital 
such as organizational structure, culture, and access to resources? How important is the human 
capital in determining a firm’s growth strategy and outcome? This paper attempts to answer 
these questions.  
To this end, we focus on the engine to a firm’s competitive advantage and long-run 
success, namely, innovation. Specifically, we isolate the contribution of the firm and its 
inventors to firm-level innovation. Innovation is difficult to achieve, requiring investment in 
human capital and significant tolerance of early failure (e.g., Manso (2011), Tian and Wang 
(2014)). While there has been many studies investigating various market and firm characteristics 
that contribute to innovation, little is known about the separate roles played by inventors and 
firms in driving innovation. This topic is of particular interest to corporate decision makers and 
policy makers in their attempts to promote innovation. This paper provides the first empirical 
study that quantifies how inventors and firms matter in innovation. 
Shedding light on the sources of innovation performance and “styles” improves our 
understanding of what constitutes a firm. While both investment performance and “styles” could 
vary in firms, we investigate two corresponding dimensions of innovation. The first dimension is 
innovation performance, measured by both the quantity and quality of innovation output. The 
second dimension is innovation “styles”, measured by exploratory score and exploitative score of 
innovation output. As defined in the management literature (Gao et al. (2015)), exploratory 
innovation is radical innovation that requires knowledge that is outside the existing knowledge 
domain, and exploitative innovation is incremental innovation that builds on existing knowledge 
and improves existing skills, processes, and structures.  
A major challenge this paper faces is to distinguish between the contribution from 
organizational capital and that from human capital. Innovation provides a unique setting that is 
clean and rich when dealing with this empirical challenge, given that we could track individual 
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 inventors’ patent filings and the citations received by their patents. On top of that, we are able to 
observe inventors’ move from one firm to another, using the Harvard Business School (HBS) 
Inventor Patent Citation database. Intuitively, if an individual’s output does not change 
whichever firm it moves to, then the individual is the sole driver of his output. If an individual’s 
output changes when he moves from one firm to another firm, then we can largely attribute the 
change in the output to the second company.  
We employ two methods to isolate the role of the firm and the inventor. The first method 
is to examine a panel of inventors that have changed their affiliated firms and to include inventor, 
firm, and year fixed effects in the specification. We refer to this approach as the mover dummy 
variable (henceforth MDV) method, which has been used commonly in existing literature (e.g., 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012)). However, because the MDV approach 
is limited to the movers only, which only account for 16% of all the inventors in our sample, we 
use an alternative method that includes both movers and stayers in the sample, as long as the 
stayers are in firms that employ at least one mover. This method is developed by Abowd, 
Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) (henceforth AKM) and later refined by Abowd, Creecy, and 
Kramarz (2002). The AKM method extends the rather small sample of movers to the 
connectedness sample, which includes 98.4% of all the inventors.  
The key results and their economic implications from our paper are similar regardless of 
the method we use. Inventor fixed effects are consistently more important than firm fixed effects 
in explaining innovation performance that is measured by patent counts and citations per patent. 
However, they are about the same as important in explaining innovation styles, measured by 
patent exploratory and exploit scores. Specifically, our estimates suggest that inventors’ human 
capital is about 13 times as important as firms’ organizational capital in explaining the firm’s 
innovation performance, while inventors’ human capital is about the same as important as firms’ 
organizational capital when explaining the firm’s innovation styles. The results suggest that 
while human capital is crucial in determining innovation performance, its effect on an inventor’s 
innovation styles is much more moderated. In other words, as inventors switch firms, their 
performance in terms of high quality patent filings is inherently determined by the inventors’ 
own human capital, but the radicalness and originality of innovation they pursue would be 
largely affected by their affiliated firms’ organizational environment.  
2 
 
 Furthermore, we find that the inventor fixed effect estimates demonstrate significant 
heterogeneity in the cross section. To understand heterogeneous effects, we explore how they 
vary in subsamples partitioned in a number of dimensions. First, we examine inventor networks. 
The degree of an inventor’s centrality is determined by the number of coauthor relationships she 
has. We postulate that an inventor at the center of coauthor relationships files more high quality 
patents. However, these inventors do not necessarily pursue more or less radical innovation, 
because the styles of innovation are largely affected by the firm. The results are consistent with 
our conjectures. We find that, compared to an average inventor in terms of network centrality, 
center inventors contribute significantly to patent counts and citations, but they do not contribute 
significantly to patent exploratory or exploitative scores.  
Second, we investigate how the mobility of inventors in a firm alters our main results. 
High inventor turnovers in a firm could be a result of two reasons. First, the inventors’ 
contribution to innovation in the firm is not as important as the firm’s organizational capital, and 
therefore these inventors are replaceable. Second, firms with high inventor mobility could have 
more talented inventors and talented inventors tend to have higher mobility than other inventors. 
We find that the second effect dominates. Inventors in high mobility firms appear to be more 
important in determining innovation output compared to inventors in low mobility firms.  
Third, we explore industry heterogeneity and focus on industries in which innovation is 
more difficult to achieve. It is likely that in these industries inventors’ human capital plays a 
dominating role than firms’ organizational capital. We find that, in drug, chemical, computer and 
electrical industries that are typically considered as high-tech industries, inventors are more 
crucial in driving innovation output than those in other industries. The findings support our 
hypothesis. 
Finally, we compare inventor contribution in public firms versus private firms. Public 
firms, being more transparent and subject to higher short-term pressures from various market 
players, tend to attract more homogeneously talented inventors. Private firms, on the other hand, 
would be more likely to bear more heterogeneous inventors with different backgrounds and skill 
sets. Therefore, it is likely that we would observe a higher inventors’ contribution to innovation 
output in public firms than in private firms. Our findings are consistent with this conjecture.  
In the final part of the paper, we conduct a series of tests to address the concern that 
inventors’ endogenous moving across firms could bias our estimation. We first show that the 
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 firms to which inventors move are smaller, younger, and have worse operating performance than 
the firms from which inventors leave. We also find that movers are on average less productive 
than stayers. These results suggest that inventors are more likely to involuntarily move to another 
worse-performing firm due to their poor innovation productivity. Hence, endogenous moving by 
inventors does not appear to be a major concern. Next, even though inventor moving in our 
sample appears involuntary, we directly address the endogenous moving concern. We first 
compare the relative importance of inventors and firms in the subsample that contains inventors 
who move up to a firm with better operating performance (hence the moving is more likely to be 
voluntary and endogenous) and in the subsample that contains inventors who move down to a 
firm with worse operating performance (hence the moving is more likely to be involuntary and 
exogenous). We find that the relative importance of inventors and firms in explaining innovation 
performance is higher in moving-up inventors. However, the relative importance in explaining 
innovation styles is similar across the two groups of inventors.  
Next, we compare the relative importance of inventors and firms when inventors move to 
similar firms (i.e., with similar past operating performance or in the same industry) and when 
inventors move to firms that are very different from their current firms (i.e., firms with different 
past operating performance or in a different industry). The concern here is that firm fixed effects 
might be underestimated if inventors endogenously choose to move to similar firms in which 
they are less likely to have changes in innovation output. We find that the relative importance of 
inventors to firms in explaining innovation performance and styles is indeed higher in the group 
of firms whose inventors move to similar firms. However, our results from inventors who move 
to different types of firms suggest that our main findings are not completely driven by inventors’ 
endogenous moving decisions.  
The contribution of our paper is threefold. First, our paper contributes to the literature on 
the economics of organization. This literature proposes different hypotheses for the existence of 
the firm and distinguishes physical from human capital (Coase (1988), Klein (1988), Williamson 
and Winter (1993)). As an empirical study, Kaplan et al. (2009) examine startup companies and 
suggest the business (nonhuman capital) is more important than the management team (human 
capital). Interestingly, our results highlight the importance of human capital in established firms, 
suggesting the differences in the nature of startups and established companies, which 
supplements Kaplan et al. (2009).  
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 Second, our paper contributes to the innovation literature by documenting the importance 
of inventors’ human capital in explaining innovation performance and styles. To the best of our 
knowledge, this paper is the first one that isolates the contribution of inventors’ human capital 
from firms’ organizational capital in determining innovation output. Prior studies have examined 
multiple determinants of innovation, including legal environment (Acharya et al. (2014)), 
banking competition (Cornaggia et al. (2015)), financial market development ((Hsu et al. (2014)) 
institutional ownership (Aghion et al. (2013)), product market competition (Aghion et al. (2005)), 
etc. However, these studies examine innovation at the firm level, and only study extensive 
margins that affect firm-level innovation. In this paper, we delve deeper at the intensive margin 
and decompose innovation drivers into human capital-related and organization capital-related 
components, which allows us to further understand relative importance of these two components 
in promoting firm innovation output.   
Third, this paper also contributes to the expanding literature that attempts to separate 
human capital and organizational capital. Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) find that 
individual effects are more important than firm effects in explaining wage variations in France. 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Graham, Li, and Qiu (2011) show that manager fixed effects 
explain a significant extent of firm policy heterogeneity and are related to management styles, 
and managers with higher performance fixed effects receive higher compensation. Ewens and 
Rhodes-Kropf (2015) find that venture capitalists have repeatable skills and VC partner’s human 
capital is more important than VC firm’s organizational capital in explaining performance. Berk, 
Binsbergen, and Liu (2014) stress the role of mutual fund firms in efficiently allocating capital to 
their managers. Existing studies are either unable to capture individuals’ output in the setting of 
workers or firm/fund managers, or have to infer individual output through indirect ways as in the 
VC partner setting. In this paper, we are able to directly track individual inventor output by using 
patents filed by each one of them. This unique feature of inventor/patent data provides a clean 
setting to test our conjectures and enables us to delve deeply and examine individual inventors’ 
performance and style.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes data and variable 
constructions. Section 3 reports the main results. Section 4 presents subsample results that 
explore the heterogeneity of our main findings. Section 5 address concerns on inventors’ 
endogenous moving. Section 6 concludes. 
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 2. Data  
2.1 Sample construction 
We begin with the latest version of the Harvard Business School (HBS) patent and 
inventor database available at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/patent. 1 The HBS patent and 
inventor database provides information for both inventors (the individuals who receive credit for 
producing the patent) and assignees (the entity that owns the patents, which could be a 
government, a firm, an organization, or an individual). For the purpose of our study, we need to 
track the employer of the inventor as she moves around from one firm to another. Since patent 
database does not contain information on employment of the inventor, we assume that the 
employer of the inventor is the company to which the patent (filed by the inventor) is assigned. 
There is a clear identification of the employer if a patent is only assigned to one assignee. 
However, when a patent is assigned to multiple assignees, the HBS patent and inventor database 
only reports the primary assignee of the patent. This issue confounds the identification of the 
employer of then inventor. To overcome this problem, we match the HBS patent and inventor 
database with the National Bureau of Economics Research (NBER) Patent Citation database that 
contains precise patent and assignee information. 2 We discuss in more detail regarding how to 
pin down the employer for each inventor when there are multiple assignees in Appendix A.  
To obtain time-varying firm characteristics, we also merge the inventor-year patent 
sample with the firm-level annual accounting variables obtained from Compustat. We require all 
firms to have non-missing financial records across our sample period. Finally, we omit 
observations before 1970 (i.e., 345 observations), which is only a small portion of our final 
sample). Our final sample consists of 204,678 inventors (1,250,041 inventor-year observations), 
that have worked for 5,722 firms from 1970 to 2003.3 
 
2.2 Variable measurement 
2.2.1 Measuring Innovation  
We construct two sets of patent-based metrics to gauge an inventor’s innovation output. 
The first set is to measure innovation performance and the second set is to capture their 
1 See Li et al. (2014) and Singh and Fleming (2010) for more details about the HBS patent and inventor database. 
2 This database is available for downloading at https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/downloads. See 
Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) for more details about the NBER patent citation database.  
3 The time span of our sample ends in 2003 because we take the innovation metrics three years ahead in our analysis 
in order to capture the long-term nature of innovation activity. 
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 innovation styles. Following the innovation literature, one measure in the first set is the total 
number of patents filed and eventually granted in a given year by an inventor, which captures the 
quantity of innovation. We use the application year instead of the grant year to determine an 
inventor’s innovation output because the patent application year is closer to the actual time when 
innovation activities take place (Griliches, Pakes, and Hall (1988), Griliches (1990)). Although 
the intuition is straightforward and it is easy to implement, a simple measure of patent counts 
hardly distinguishes breakthrough innovations from incremental technological discoveries 
(Trajtenberg (1990)). Hence, we construct another metric of innovation output, the total number 
of non-self citations each patent receives in subsequent years. We use this measure to capture the 
quality (or the impact) of innovation.  
Nevertheless, both innovation measures suffer from severe truncation problems. Because 
in our matched sample we only observe patents that are eventually granted by the end of 2006, 
patents filed in the last few years may still be under review and not granted by 2006 (this 
truncation problem is mainly caused by using the NBER database to match). To adjust the 
truncation bias in patent counts, we calculate the number of patents filed by each inventor (and 
eventually granted) of a given year in the HBS database, which contains patents granted through 
2010. To the extent that the patent application outcomes have been announced by 2010 for the 
patents filed by 2006, this approach greatly alleviates the patent truncation concern. Similarly, 
patents tend to receive citations over a long period after its grant date, but we observe at best the 
citations received up to 2010.4 To deal with this truncation bias, we correct the citation data by 
using the “weight factors” following Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001, 2005) and estimating the 
shape of the citation-lag distribution.  
Consistent with the innovation literature, the distribution of patent grants in our final 
sample is right skewed, with its median at zero. Due to the right skewness of patent counts and 
citations per patent, we use the natural logarithm of one plus patent counts (LnPatent) and the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of citations per patent (LnCitePat) as the main 
innovation metrics to measure innovation performance in our analysis. We also winsorize all our 
dependent variables at the 99th percentile. 
4 As the HBS patent database contains citation information up to 2010, our best observing window closes in 2010. 
However, this does not help too much in adjustment for the citation truncation problem because patents may keep 
receiving citations over a long period of time beyond 2010. 
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 The second set of metrics includes exploitative (Exploit) and exploratory scores (Explore), 
which reflect an inventor’s innovation styles. We follow existing literature (e.g., Sorensen and 
Stuart (2000), Katila and Ahuja (2002), etc.) to categorize an inventor’s patenting activity into 
exploratory innovation and exploitative innovation. The basic idea is that inventors concentrating 
on their existing knowledge are expected to produce more exploitative patents while inventors 
exploring new ideas are expected to create more exploratory patents. We define an inventor’s 
existing knowledge as her previous patent portfolio and the set of patents that has been cited by 
her own patents over the past five years. Then proxies are constructed such that a patent is 
classified exploitative if at least 60% of its citations are based on existing knowledge, and a 
patent is classified exploratory if at least 60% of its citations are based on new knowledge.5 We 
then set Exploit equal to the ratio of the number of exploitative patents for a given year to the 
total number of patents filed by the inventor in the same year. In a similar way, we define 
Explore by the ratio of the number of exploratory patents for a given year to the total number of 
patents filed by the inventor in the same year.  
Note that the patent databases used in our study are unlikely to be affected by 
survivorship bias. As long as a patent application is eventually granted, the patent is attributed to 
the applying firm at the time of application even if the firm later gets acquired or goes bankrupt. 
Moreover, because patent citations are attributed to the patent rather than the assignee, the patent 
granted to a firm that later gets acquired or goes bankrupt can still keep receiving citations long 
after the firm disappears. For firm characteristics, we compute all variables for firm i over its 
fiscal year t. Our control variables include firm size (the natural logarithm of book value assets), 
firm age (the natural logarithm of a firm’s age since its IPO year), profitability (ROA), 
investments in intangible assets (R&D expenditures over total assets), asset tangibility (net PPE 
scaled by total assets), leverage, capital expenditures, growth opportunities (Tobin’s Q), financial 
constraints (the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) five-variable KZ index), and industry concentration 
(the Herfindahl index based on sales). Aghion et al. (2005) points out non-linear effects of 
product market competition on innovation output. Hence, we include the squared Herfindahl 
index in our regressions. We provide detailed variable definitions in the Appendix B. 
 
 
5 We also use 80% as a cutoff point. The results are robust to that.  
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 2.3 Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents information on the movers and stayers in our sample. Panel A shows 
that during the sample period, 15.91% of (or 32,561) inventors are movers who work in more 
than one firm in the sample, while the rest (84.09%) are non-movers who work in the same 
sample firm throughout our sample period. Panel B provides information on the proportion of 
firms that have a given number of movers during the sample period. 24.68% of the sample firms 
do not have any movers while the remaining 75.32% of (4,310) firms have at least one mover. 
According to the AKM method, we are able to identify the fixed effects of inventors who work 
in these 4,310 firms regardless of whether they are movers or stayers, which constitutes the 
connectedness sample. In the robustness check, we perform the MDV method on the mobility 
sample, which comprises of 32,561 movers as well as 4,310 firms at which these movers are 
employed.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
2.2.2 Measuring control variables 
Following the innovation literature, we control for a vector of inventor and firm 
characteristics that may affect innovation output. For inventor time-varying characteristics, we 
create proxies for inventors’ prior innovation experience. Two variables, LnExpnum and 
LnExpcit, are defined as the logarithm of one plus the average metrics (adjusted patent count and 
patent citation, respectively) over the past three years. We use a three-year rolling window 
because recent experience is a good indicator that the inventor is an active participant in 
innovation (Chemmanur, Ertugrul, and Krishnan (2015)). The construction of these variables 
requires information on the past three years’ invention experience, and hence we exclude the first 
three-year observations for all inventors because their prior innovation experience is missing. We 
also exclude the inventors whose moving happens in the first three years in our sample period so 
that we can keep the mobility structure intact. 
 [Insert Table 2 Here] 
To minimize the effect of outliers, we winsorize all control variables at the 1st and 99th   
percentiles. Table 2 provides summary statistics of the variables in both the full sample and the 
connectedness sample, in order to examine whether the connectedness sample is representative 
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 of the full sample (Brav et al. (2005)).6 Panel A summarizes the representativeness of these 
variables for inventors. On average, an inventor in the sample has 0.97 granted patents per year 
and each patent receives 6.90 citations. In the connectedness sample, an inventor has a similar 
number of patents granted per year, 0.97 and each patent receives 6.91 citations. The other 
variables that measure inventors’ prior innovation experience are also very close in both the full 
sample and the connectedness sample.  
Panel B of Table 2 summarizes the representativeness of these variables for firms. In the 
full sample, an average firm has book value assets of $7.12 billion, R&D-to-assets ratio of 5.9%, 
ROA of 11.5%, PPE-to-assets ratio of 29.8%, leverage of 22.2%, capital expenditure ratio of 
6.8%, Tobin’s Q of 1.9, and is 21.9 years old since its IPO date. In the connectedness sample, 
these statistics are quite close: an average firm has book value assets of $7.57 billion, R&D-to-
assets ratio of 6.0%, ROA of 12.1%, PPE-to-assets ratio of 29.9%, leverage of 22.0%, capital 
expenditure ratio of 6.9%, Tobin’s Q of 1.9, and is 22.4 years old since its IPO date. Overall, 
these comparisons allow us to infer that our connectedness sample is representative of the 
universe of inventors and firms in the full sample. 
 
3. Main results 
3.1 Empirical methods 
Our empirical tests relate inventor and firm characteristics in the current year to the 
metrics of innovation output three years ahead in view of the long-term nature of innovation 
process. Consider the following linear model of inventors’ innovation 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡+3): 
                           𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡+3) = 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡                                     (1) 
where 𝑖𝑖 denotes inventor, 𝑗𝑗 denotes firm, and 𝑡𝑡 denotes year when the innovation activity occurs. 
In above equation, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 and 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 include time-varying controls for inventor and firm. 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 captures 
the year fixed effects. Our focus is to retrieve both inventor and firm fixed effects 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖  and 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖  
utilizing movements of inventors across firms.  
We use a method first proposed by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) (hereafter 
referred to as AKM method) and later refined by Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz (2002). The 
6 When using Exploit and Explore indices as dependent variables in the baseline regression, the sample size is 
different since we assign a missing value for an inventor of a year in the case that no patent was filed by him or her. 
We provide summary statistics of Exploit and Explore for both the full sample and the connectedness sample in the 
online appendix. 
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 AKM method allows us to separate firm and inventor fixed effects through connectedness 
sample, which includes not only moving inventors but also non-movers who work in firms that 
have hired at least one mover. To define a connectedness sample, we use graph theory to 
determine groups of inventors and firms that are connected. Detailed procedures are as follow: 
Start with an arbitrary inventor and track all firms where he or she has ever worked. Then we 
include all inventors whoever work in the firms mentioned above into our connectedness sample 
and continue tracking all firms for which these inventors have ever worked. Repeat the 
procedure until all data are exhausted. 7  Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz (2002) show that 
connections make the estimation of inventor and firm fixed effects for each connected group 
relative to a within-group benchmark computationally feasible. To make inventor and firm fixed 
effects directly comparable across groups, we follow the normalization procedure suggested by 
Cornelissen (2008): First, we normalize the mean firm fixed effects for each group to zero and 
add the group mean firm fixed effects to inventor fixed effects; Second, we subtract the grand 
mean of inventor fixed effects from each inventor fixed effect and then add this grand mean 
inventor fixed effect to the intercept. 
An analogous method (i.e., the MDV method) proposed by Bertrand and Schoar (2003) 
employs the mobility sample consisting of only movers and firms for which they work to 
separate firm fixed effects from individual fixed effects, using the LSDV approach. One 
disadvantage of the MDV method compared to the AKM method is a potential sample selection 
bias resulting from the restriction of sample to only movers who could be different from non-
movers. Besides what we mentioned above, there are some other important benefits of adopting 
the AKM framework. First, the AKM method uses information of both movers and non-movers, 
which gives us larger sample size and higher statistical power. Secondly, it can significant reduce 
the computational work in terms of the large dataset used in our study. Nonetheless, we still 
conduct the MDV approach in our analysis as a robustness check 
We now provide a detailed discussion on how the AKM method separately identifies 
inventor and firm fixed effects using the connectedness sample, because it’s useful to understand 
7 In most of our analyses, we use Cornelissen’s (2008) Stata command “felsdvreg” to implement the AKM method 
and estimate both inventor and firm fixed effects. This command facilitates the estimation of a linear model with 
two high-dimensional fixed effects (i.e., inventor and firm fixed effects) by using a memory-saving decomposition 
of the design matrix. It also provides useful summary statistics when taking care of identification issues. In some 
situations with tremendous data size, we switch to the Stata command “reghdfe” proposed by Correia (2014), which 
is more efficient when dealing with data that requires large memory. 
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 the basic futures of the AKM to better appreciate its advantages and realize its limitations. 
Define the variable 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 as a dummy that is equal to one if inventor 𝑖𝑖 works at firm 𝑘𝑘 at time 𝑡𝑡 
and zero otherwise. Then we can rewrite equation (1) as: 
      𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡+3) = 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡.                              (2) 
In the first step, the AKM approach sweeps out the inventor fixed effects by averaging 
over all inventor 𝑖𝑖’s innovation performances to obtain: 
                            𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2?̅?𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝐷𝐷�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖=1 + ?̅?𝜇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖?̅?𝑖.                                   (3) 
Here 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖  is inventor 𝑖𝑖’s average innovation performance across the full sample period. 
Then we begin to demean (2) with (3) in order to get: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡+3) − 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽2�𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − ?̅?𝑍𝑖𝑖� + ∑ (𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖=1 + (𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 − ?̅?𝜇𝑡𝑡) + �𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝜖𝜖?̅?𝑖�.  (4) 
Through demeaning process the inventor fixed effects have been removed. Now it’s clear 
that we are able to exploit movers’ information to identify firm fixed effects since 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≠0 for a mover, which can be estimated by the LSDV method. Finally, using the estimates in 
above regression, we can recover the inventor fixed effects following equation: 
                                        𝜙𝜙�𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖 − ?̂?𝛽1𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖 − ?̂?𝛽2?̅?𝑍𝑖𝑖 − ∑ 𝐷𝐷�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖=1                                         (5) 
and here ?̅?𝜇𝑡𝑡 is often treated as the benchmark in estimating time effects and thereby assumed to 
be zero. 
As Abowd et al. (2004) and Andrews et al. (2008) note, an estimation bias may emerge 
when inventor mobility is limited, which could lead to imprecise estimation of inventor and firm 
fixed effects. Consequently, we need to be cautious when interpreting the results in both the 
MDV and AKM methods. However, this issue is not severe in our study as our sample contains 
about 16% movers. This proportion is much higher than that in previous literature (e.g. Graham, 
Li, and Qiu (2012)). Another property of the AKM estimator is that fixed effects estimates 
themselves have properties that are similar to other estimators. As shown by Wooldridge (2010), 
the estimates of the time-varying variable coefficients are unbiased and consistent, while the 
fixed effects estimates are only unbiased.  
 
3.2 Baseline results 
In this section, we analyze how unobserved inventor and firm time invariant 
characteristics affect inventors’ innovation performance and styles using the AKM method. The 
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 AKM method uses a connectedness sample that eliminates firms that do not have a mover during 
our sample period. Based on this procedure, the connectedness sample in the AKM estimates for 
innovation performance has 201,461 inventors (32,561 movers), 4,310 firms, and 1,239,614 
inventor-year observations, which accounts for 98% of all inventors, 75% of all firms, and 99% 
of all observation units. 
We follow the prior literature to select the observable characteristics of inventors and 
firms that may affect an inventor’s future innovation output (e.g., He and Tian, 2013; Tian and 
Wang, 2014; Seru, 2014; Cornaggia et al., 2015.). Specifically, in our full fixed effects model we 
regress the proxy of inventors’ innovation performance on both firm time-varying variables, such 
as firm size, age, profitability, intangible asset, and on inventor time-varying variables, such as 
prior experience of inventor. Additionally, we include year fixed effects to capture the impact of 
economic conditions. 
Table 3 reports the results of estimating equation (1) using the AKM method in the 
connectedness sample. We suppress all coefficient estimates and focus on the relative economic 
importance of time-invariant inventor and firm characteristics. Following Graham, Li and Qiu 
(2012) and Ewens and Rhodes-Kropf (2015), we use 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑌𝑌,𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼  𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)
𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝐼𝐼(𝑌𝑌)  to examine the 
contribution of inventor fixed effects to the total variation in inventors’ innovation output. 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑌𝑌,𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)
𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝐼𝐼(𝑌𝑌)  reports the covariance of the dependent variable with inventor fixed effects, 
scaled by the dependent variable’s variance. These normalized covariance term represents the 
fractions of total variations attributable to particular factors, which can effectively capture the 
relative importance of different fixed effects in explaining the dependent variable for a given 
regression model. In addition, we report the incremental change in adjusted-R square across 
three different model specifications in Table 3: the first specification in which we include all 
control variables and year effects; the second specification in which we include all control 
variables, year effects, and firm fixed effects; the third specification in which we include all 
control variables, year effects, and inventor fixed effects; the final specification in which we 
include all control variables and all fixed effects using the AKM method. Adjusted R-squares are 
adopted in this case because the number of explanatory variables changes across models. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
For patent counts in column 1, inventor fixed effects account for 67.8% of the total 
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 variation while firm fixed effects contribute to 5.5% of the total variation (the left portion is 
attributable to all other controls). The relative importance of inventor fixed effects compared to 
firm fixed effects is measured by the ratio of the contribution of these two fixed effects, which is 
13 times in column 1. For patent citations in column 2, 90.4% of the total variation corresponds 
to inventor fixed effects while 6.33% of the total variation corresponds to firm fixed effects. The 
relative importance between inventor and firm fixed effects amounts to about 14 times. Overall, 
for patent counts and citations, the stark differences in explanatory power between inventor and 
firm fixed effects reflect that innovation performance is largely driven by inventor fixed effects. 
These results show the important role of inventors’ inherent ability or time invariant 
characteristics, compared to firms’ time invariant characteristics, in shaping innovation output. 
 In columns 3 and 4, we examine exploitative and exploratory scores to gauge innovation 
style. The results show that the relative importance between inventor and firm fixed effects is 
about 1.4 in column 3 and about 1.3 in column 4, which suggest that the explanatory power of 
inventor fixed effects and firm fixed effects is very close in explaining innovation style. The 
result suggests that the firm’s organizational capital has a relatively more important impact on 
innovation style than innovation performance. While inventors appear to be able to carry their 
innovation ability to the new firm they move to, their innovation style is more likely to be 
affected by the new environment they get into. Table 3 also reports the F-statistics for the joint 
significance of both fixed effects and the significance of fixed effects for inventor or firm 
individually. They all consistently fail to reject the null. 
The explanatory power of all control variables and year effects are different when using 
different dependent variables: 28.3% for patent counts, 11.8% for patent citations, 7.4% for the 
exploitative score and 11.3% for the exploratory score. Including inventor (or firm) fixed effects 
increases the adjusted R-squared. For example, adding firm fixed effects increases the adjusted 
R-square by 0.5% while adding inventor fixed effects increase the adjusted R-square by 6.6% 
when dependent variable is LnPatent. The extent of adjusted R-square increment corresponding 
to inventor (or firm) fixed effects is consistent with our results on the relative importance of 
inventor and firm fixed effects above. Coming back to the example of LnPatent, the ratio of the 
increment of adjusted R-square when including inventor fixed effects to the increment of 
adjusted R-square when including firm fixed effects is about 13, which is similar to our estimates 
above. 
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 3.3. Robustness checks 
In this subsection, we conduct additional tests to check the robustness of our baseline 
findings.  
First, we implement the MDV method used in Bertrand and Schoar (2003) by restricting 
the sample to the mobility sample in which only inventors who move across firms are included. 
The mobility sample includes 32,561 movers (21,139 movers when using Exploit and Explore 
indices as dependent variables) as well as 4,310 (3,249 firms when using Exploit and Explore 
indices as dependent variables) firms for which they work. Note that in the mobility sample, the 
number of firms is equal to that in the connectedness sample because only firms with movers can 
be identified whatever the method adopted. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results using the MDV method. The inventor fixed effects 
continue to explain a significant portion of innovation performance. Specifically, inventor fixed 
effects have almost 7 to 8 times more explanatory power than firm fixed effects when using 
innovation performance measures (patent counts and citations) as dependent variables, which is 
consistent with the big gap of the explanatory power between inventor and firm fixed effects in 
our baseline regressions. In terms of the metrics of innovation styles (Exploit and Exlpore 60), 
the contribution of inventor fixed effects is similar to that of firm fixed effects in explaining the 
total variation as the ratio turns to be about 0.7, which is also consistent with our main results. 
Although the relative contribution between inventor and firm fixed effects is different when 
using the AKM method and the MDV method (e.g., changing from 13.0 to 7.7 when LnPatent is 
used, from 1.4 to 0.7 when Exploit is used), the main economic messages are the same with 
either the MDV method or the AKM method: inventors are way more important than firms when 
explaining innovation performance and inventors play a similar important role to firms when 
explaining innovation style. In fact, as detailed in Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012), such change in 
the relative contribution between inventor and firm fixed effects with two methods is the result 
of sample difference and normalization procedure. The incremental change in adjusted-R square 
across three different model specifications with the mobility sample are also consistent with our 
earlier findings reported in Table 3. 
Second, we conduct another robust test using the AKM method on the largest group of 
the connectedness sample. A noted issue in the AKM method is to pin down each connected 
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 group in the connectedness sample and all fixed effects are identified relative to a benchmark 
within each group. To ensure all fixed effects are comparable across groups in the connectedness 
sample, we follow Cornelissen (2008) to normalize both inventor and firm fixed effects. 
Nevertheless, there remains an issue regarding the change of the relative explanatory power of 
inventor and firm fixed effects as the normalization procedure re-weights the between-group 
explanatory power. To mitigate this concern, we re-estimate all our regressions using only the 
largest group of the connectedness sample and thereby normalization is not required. Moreover, 
the largest group is composed of 32,450 movers, 168,566 stayers, 4,130 firms, and 1,237,555 
inventor-year observations, which accounts for 99% of inventors, 96% of firms, and 99% of 
inventor-year observations of the connectedness sample. This enlarged sample grants a great 
power to remedy the bias caused by normalization. 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the results using the largest group and we find they are 
qualitatively similar to what we obtained in the baseline regressions. We reexamine the relative 
importance of inventor and firm fixed effects in determining inventors’ innovation performance 
and innovation style. The AKM results using LnPatent and LnCitePat as dependent variables 
from the largest group show that the ratio of inventor fixed effects’ contribution to firm fixed 
effects’ contribution in explaining total variation is about 13 to 14 times. When using Exploit and 
Explore as dependent variables to measure innovation style, the relative contribution between 
inventors and firms is about 1.5 times. All F-statistics for the joint significance of both fixed 
effects and the significance of fixed effects for inventor or firm individually consistently reject 
the null. We also report the adjusted R-square of the AKM method in all four columns. Overall, 
these additional tests suggest that our results in the baseline regressions are robust. 
 
3.4 Heterogeneity in inventor fixed effects 
So far, we have shown that inventor-specific effects explain a significant fraction of the 
variation in innovation performance and styles. Additionally, we would like to assess how big 
these observed differences inventors are. Therefore, we look at the distributions of fixed effects 
estimated above. We plot the density distribution function of estimated inventor fixed effects 
using four different dependent variables. Because fixed effects are estimated relative to a 
benchmark, the location and the mean of the estimated fixed effects may vary when picking 
different benchmark. So we demean inventor fixed effects in all our figures without changing the 
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 shape of the distribution function. 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
In Figure 1, we plot four distributions in Panels A to D that corresponds to the retrieved 
inventor fixed effects with different dependent variables. Panels A and B of Figure 1 plot the 
estimated inventor fixed effects distributions when using metrics of innovation performance 
(LnPatent and LnCitePat) as the dependent variables. Both distributions are slightly left skewed 
and this observation is consistent with the fact that patent count and citation data are left skewed 
due to the fact that many inventors filed no patents in some years. Our results contrasts with 
many prior studies that estimated individual fixed effects are roughly normally distributed (e.g. 
Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) and Ewens and Rhodes-Kropf (2015)), which underscores the 
features of invention: innovations, especially high-quality innovations, are mainly driven by a 
few inventors with great talent or inherent characteristics. It’s also noteworthy that the 
distribution of estimated inventor fixed effects in terms of patent citation (Panel B) has higher 
dispersion and fatter tails than that of estimated inventor fixed effects in terms of patent number 
(Panel A). This observation indicates that the time invariant characteristics of inventors in 
determining the quality of innovations are much more dispersed than that of inventors in shaping 
the number of innovations. This estimate contributes to a large literature on innovation skill 
dispersion and productivities and could help parameterize models that proxy for variations in 
innovation skill (e.g., Iranzo, Schivardi, and Tosetti (2006) and Bombardini, Gallipoli, and 
Pupato (2012)).  
In Panels C and D of Figure 1, we plot the distributions of estimated inventor fixed 
effects using the metrics of innovation style (Exploit and Explore) as dependent variables. 
Compared with Panels A and B, both distributions in C and D are more concentrated, which 
shows that there is a smaller difference in inventors’ time invariant characteristics that 
determines their innovation style than that determines their innovation performance. Figure 2 
shows the distribution of estimated inventor fixed effects in the largest group, which has a 
similar shape with Figure 1. 
 [Insert Figure 2 Here] 
For a more precise assessment of the dispersion of inventor fixed effects, we tabulate the 
distribution of retrieved inventor fixed effects from the AKM regressions in Table 5. We show 
median, standard deviation, 25th percentile, and 75th percentile in both Panel A and Panel B, in 
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 which Panel A corresponds to the distribution of inventor fixed effects using the connectedness 
sample and Panel B corresponds to the distribution of inventor fixed effects using the largest 
group.  
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
Overall, Table 5 shows that the variation in the size of inventor fixed effects is 
economically large. To highlight some examples, row 1 of Panel A shows that the difference 
between an inventor at the 25th percentile of the natural logarithm of patent count distribution 
and one at the 75th percentile is 0.445. The difference is equivalent to 0.439 patents, which is 45% 
of the sample mean of patent counts (0.965). In terms of the natural logarithm of citations per 
patent, row 2 of Panel A shows that the difference between an inventor at the 25th percentile and 
one at the 75th percentile is 0.694. The difference is equivalent to 1.241 citations per patent, 
which accounts for 18% of the average citations per patent in the sample (6.899).   
For the exploitative score in row 3 of Panel A, the difference between an inventor in the 
25th percentile and that in the 75th percentile is 0.115. The economic effect is large given that the 
average exploitative score in our sample is 0.126. Finally, for the exploratory score in the last 
row of Panel A, the difference between an inventor in the 25th percentile and an inventor in the 
75th percentile is 0.255, which is sizable given that the average exploratory score in the sample is 
0.342. 
 
4. Heterogeneity in the cross section 
In this section, we conduct cross-sectional analysis in the full fixed effects model to 
better understand how inventor and firm heterogeneity alters our baseline results. These cross-
sectional tests provide additional insights on how relative roles of inventors and firms would 
change in response to different characteristics of inventors and firms. 
 
4.1 Firms with high centrality  
In this subsection we examine whether the inventor is more important in firms with more 
“key” inventors. We define whether an inventor is a key inventor based on his or her normalized 
degree of centrality in the whole inventor co-authorship network. Following Hochberg, 
Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007), we calculate an inventor’s normalized degree of centrality each year, 
which is equal to the number of coauthor relationships in the past three years an inventor has in 
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 the network divided by the maximum possible coauthor relationships in the past three years he or 
she can have in an n-inventor network. For example, in a co-authorship network with 10 
inventors observed in the past three years, inventor 𝑖𝑖′s normalized degree of centrality is equal to 
𝑛𝑛 9⁄  in which 9 is maximum number of ties inventor 𝑖𝑖 can form in this network if he or she have 
coauthored with other inventors in the past three years. After computing all inventors’ 
normalized degree of centrality in each year, we define an inventor of a year who is in the top 10% 
of normalized degree of centrality as a “key” inventor of the firm in that year. Then across our 
sample period, we calculate the average number of “key” inventors per year for each firm and 
select those connected firms that are in the top 10% in terms of the average number of “key” 
inventors. Our final subsample of firms with high centrality consists of 424 firms and 166,897 
inventors when using LnPatent and LnCitePat as the dependent variables, and 320 firms and 
146,083 inventors when using Exploit and Explore as the dependent variables. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
We report the results of the AKM estimation in the subsample of firms with high 
centrality in Table 6. In each column, we report the contribution of inventor and firm fixed 
effects in explaining the variation in the subsample as well as the fraction of model R-square 
explained by each set of variables in parentheses. We also report the ratio of the contribution of 
inventor fixed effects to that of firm fixed effects.  
Consistent with our main results, inventor fixed effects are more important than firm 
fixed effects in explaining innovation output measured by patent counts, citations per patent, and 
exploitative and exploratory scores. They contribute much more in determining innovation 
performance than innovation styles. Furthermore, in a comparison with our baseline results the 
ratio of the contribution of inventor fixed effects to the contribution of firm fixed effects 
increases. For example, the ratio increases from 13.0 in the baseline regression to 15.8 in this 
subsample when using the patent counts as the dependent variable. The ratio increases from 1.4 
to 1.5 when using Exploit as the dependent variable. In particular, the extent of the ratio increase 
is larger among regressions using the metrics of innovation performance. This result indicates 
that in firms with a higher degree of centrality (having more “key” inventors), the relative 
importance of inventors fixed effects in explaining innovation, in particular innovation 
performance, becomes more pronounced.  
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 4.2 Firms with high mobility 
We consider a subsample of firms with high mobility in this subsection to investigate the 
relation between inventor turnover of a firm and innovation output produced by inventors in this 
firm. As discussed in the introduction, there are two competing arguments regarding the relative 
contribution of inventors in a firm with high mobility. On the one hand, high inventor turnover 
could imply that these firms’ inventors are replaceable and hence firms’ organizational capital 
should matter more. One the other hand, high inventor turnover could indicate high standards 
implemented by the firm, which makes the firm pursue talented inventors and thereby induces 
larger inventor contribution to the firm’s innovation output.  
To examine these alternative arguments above, we construct a subsample of firms with 
high inventor mobility. We define the mobility of a firm as the ratio of total number of movers to 
the total number of inventors of the firm. We then pick those connected firms that are in the top 
20% bracket in terms of their mobility scores to form our subsample. 8  The subsample is 
comprised of 556 firms and 20,691 inventors when using patent counts and citations as the 
dependent variable, and 433 firms and 17,611 inventors when using exploitative and explorative 
ratios as the dependent variable. 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
Table 7 reports the results using the AKM method in the subsample of firms with high 
inventor mobility. In each column, we report the portions of inventor fixed effects and firm fixed 
effects that explains the variation in the subsample as well as the fraction of model R-square 
explained by each set of variables in parentheses. We also report the ratio of the contribution of 
inventor fixed effects to that of firm fixed effects.  
The results suggest that inventor fixed effects are more important than firm fixed effects 
in explaining the four innovation metrics and inventor fixed effects contribute much more in 
determining innovation performance metrics than innovation style metrics. On top of that, 
different from our baseline results, the ratio of inventor fixed effect contribution to firm fixed 
effect contribution becomes larger in this subsample analysis. In column 1, the ratio rises from 
12.0 (in the baseline tests) to 18.6 in the regression with patent counts as the dependent variable. 
In column 2 in which patent citation is the dependent variable, this ratio climbs rapidly from 14.3 
8 Here we do not restrict our sample to the top 10% as before because all these top 20% firms receive the same 
scores regarding mobility. 
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 (in the baseline tests) to 87.0. In the regressions with innovation style metrics are the dependent 
variable, this ratio increases from 1.4 to 2.0 in column 3 and from 1.3 to 2.3 in column 4. All 
these results show that, in firms with high inventor mobility (i.e., high frequency in inventor 
turnovers), the relative contribution of inventor is more important in explaining innovation 
output, which supports our second arguments.  
 
4.3 High-tech firms 
The third dimension we consider when exploring heterogeneity focuses on a subsample 
of high-tech firms. Because human capital tends to be more important in high-tech industries in 
which innovation is more difficult to achieve, we postulate that inventors’ human capital plays a 
more significant role in determining innovation output than firms’ organizational capital.  
Following Tian and Wang (2014), we classify patents in our sample into four categories: 
(1) drugs, medical instrumentation, and chemicals (hereafter drugs); (2) computers, 
communications, and electrical (hereafter computers/electrical); (3) software programming and 
internet applications (hereafter software); (4) other miscellaneous patents. Based on the category 
of patents a firm produces most, we sort all our sample firms into one of above four categories. If 
a firm has no patent, then we classify it into one of these four categories based on the type of 
patents that are most frequently produced by the firm’s industry. Our subsample of high-tech 
firms consists of all firms in drugs and computers/electrical and inventors who work for these 
firms. The sample includes 2,556 firms and 145,857 inventors in the regressions using patent 
counts and citations as the dependent variable, and 1,996 firms and 132,157 inventors in the 
regressions using Exploit and Explore as the dependent variable. 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
Table 8 presents the results using the AKM method to estimate both inventor fixed 
effects and firm fixed effects. In each column, we report the contributions of inventor and firm 
fixed effects in explaining the variation in the subsample and the fraction of model R-square 
explained by each set of variables in parentheses. We also compute the ratio of inventor and firm 
fixed effects’ relative contribution.  
Compared with our baseline results, these ratios in the high-tech subsample are larger: in 
column 1 the relative importance ratio increases from 13.0 to 15.4; in column 2 this ratio raises 
from 14.3 to 15.4; in column 3 the ratio increases from 1.4 to 1.6 and column 4 reports that the 
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 ratio increases from 1.3 to 1.6. These results suggest that in high-tech industries inventors’ 
human capital is more crucial in driving innovation output than that of inventors in an average 
industry. Table 8 also reports that the results of F-tests for joint significance of both inventor 
fixed effects and firm fixed effects as well as the respective significance of each fixed effect. We 
are able to reject the null hypothesis.  
 
4.4 Public vs. private firms 
Our final cross-sectional test compares public firms with private firms. Our baseline 
estimation and previous subsample tests focus on the connectedness sample containing only 
public firms because we match the inventor-year data with the financial data in Compustat. In 
this subsection, we include those unmatched private firms into our sample and re-estimate 
inventor fixed effects and firm fixed effects using the AKM method in the pooled sample 
including both public and private firms. We also separately do the same estimation in the private 
firm sample. Our goal is to explore the differences in the relative contribution of inventors’ 
human capital and firms’ organizational capital in explaining innovation output between public 
and private firms. 
Our pooled sample (including both public and private firms) has 63,501 firms and 
431,903 inventors and the sample of private firms includes 51,454 firms and 280,001 inventors. 
It suggests that an average public firm has more inventors than private firms. Because we do not 
observe accounting information for private firms, our regressions exclude all firm financial 
controls. We, however, still control for inventors’ prior innovation experience and year effects. 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
Table 9 estimates the full fixed effects model using both the pooled sample of public and 
private firms and the subsample of private firms only. 9  In each column, we report the 
contributions of inventor fixed effects and firm fixed effects in explaining the variation in the 
sample and the fraction of model R-square explained by each set of variables in parentheses. We 
also compute the ratio of inventor and firm fixed effects’ relative contribution.  
9 As the sample size grows disproportionately after including private firms into our sample, the Stata command 
“felsdvreg” proposed by Cornelissen (2008) becomes infeasible in our analysis. Here we switch to another 
command “reghdfe” detailed by Correia (2014) to implement the AKM estimation, which is more efficient when 
dealing with data requiring large memory. 
22 
 
                                                 
 We continue to observe that, in the pooled sample that includes both public and private 
firms, inventor fixed effects play a more significant role than firm fixed effects in driving 
innovation. Further, inventors contribute more in determining innovation performance metrics 
(patent counts and citations) than innovation style metrics (exploitative and explorative ratios). 
For example, the ratio that assesses the relative contribution of inventor fixed effects and firm 
fixed effects is 9.3 in the pooled sample with patent counts as the dependent variable and it is 1.3 
in the pooled sample with the exploitative score as dependent variable.  
Next, we examine the difference between public and private firms in the relative 
contribution of inventors’ human capital and firms’ organizational capital. One argument is that 
public firms tend to attract more homogeneously talented inventors because they are more 
transparent and subject to a larger degree of pressures from short-term investors while private 
firms are more likely to hire more heterogeneous inventors due to more degree of freedom 
protected by their private ownership. This difference leads to the hypothesis that, in public firms, 
inventors’ human capital contributes more relative to firms’ organizational capital in determining 
innovation output.  
In Table 9, we compare the ratio of inventor fixed effects to firm fixed effects estimated 
from the pooled sample and from the private firm sample. In column 1 in which the dependent 
variable is patent counts, the ratio in the pooled sample, 9.3, is larger than that in the private 
sample, 7.5. In column 2 in which patent citation is the dependent variable, the ratio is 6.6 in the 
pooled sample and it is 5.3 in the private sample. Regarding innovation style metrics, we 
continue to observe that the ratio in the pooled sample is bigger than that in the private sample. 
These results suggest that inventors of private firms are relatively less important in determining 
innovation performance than that of public firms. The evidence is consistent with our conjecture.  
 
5. Addressing inventors’ endogenous moving 
Because we rely on inventors’ moving across firms to estimate the relative importance of 
firms’ organizational capital and inventors’ human capital, an important concern is that our 
results could be biased due to endogenous moving by inventors. For example, if an inventor 
moves because she expects changes in her innovation output, we could wrongly attribute the 
change in innovation output to the firm’s organizational capital. Alternatively, if an inventor only 
moves to a firm with similar performance, we could underestimate the contribution of firms’ 
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 organizational capital to her innovation output. We perform four sets of tests to address this 
endogenous moving concern.  
First, we compare the characteristics of firms to and from which inventors move. We also 
compare the characteristics of movers and stayers. These tests help gauge the extent to which 
inventors’ endogenous moving is a serious concern.  
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
Panel A of Table 10 compares the characteristics of firms that inventors move to and 
move from. We find that firms that inventors leave are on average larger, older, with better 
operating performance as well as with a higher leverage. The results suggest that on average 
movers end up in a firm that appears to be smaller, younger and less profitable than their 
previous firms. To the extent that individuals seek better career opportunities in better firms 
when they voluntarily move, this finding suggests that inventor moving in our sample is more 
likely due to involuntary moving (e.g., being laid off or demoted). Panel B compares the 
characteristics of movers and stayers. Movers generally produce fewer patents than stayers, and 
movers’ patents receive fewer citations than stayers. The results suggest that an average mover 
has worse innovation performance than a stayer. This finding again suggests that movers are 
unlikely to leave the current firm voluntarily and hence our setting is unlikely to be subject to 
endogenous inventor moving.    
 Second, assuming endogenous moving exists, to directly address the concern, we divide 
inventors into two groups. The first group includes inventors who “move up” in the sense that 
the firms they are joining have better past operating performance (i.e., ROA) than the ones they 
are leaving. The second group includes inventors who “move down”, i.e., these inventors are 
joining firms that have worse past operating performance (i.e., ROA) than the ones they are 
leaving. We assume that an inventor who “moves up” is more likely to move voluntarily and 
who “moves down” is more likely to move involuntarily (and thus more exogenous). Therefore, 
we could overestimate firm fixed effects and hence underestimate the relative importance of 
inventors’ human capital relative to firms’ organizational capital for “moving-up” inventors who 
are more subject to endogenous moving.10 
10 When we divide the sample by inventor moves, we restrict the observations to the sample of movers who only 
move once (This is the sample we use for Table 11). This is because if the movers move multiple times, it is difficult 
to divide the sample according to their moving types (i.e., moving up vs. moving down, moving to similar firms vs. 
moving to different firms).  
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 [Insert Table 11 Here] 
 In Table 11 Panels A and B, we report the results for “moving-down” and “moving-up” 
inventors, respectively. In Panel A we observe that the inventor is about 30 times as important as 
the firm in explaining patent counts in the group of inventors who move down. This finding 
helps alleviate endogenous moving concerns because it is unlikely that an inventor endogenously 
choose to move down. In Panel B we see that the inventor is only 11 times as important as the 
firm in explaining patent counts in the group of inventors who move up to. The relative 
importance of the inventor to the firm in explaining citations is also smaller for the group of 
inventors who move up. Regarding innovation styles, we do not observe a significant change in 
the relative importance of inventors’ human capital and firms’ organizational capital across the 
two groups of inventors. This observation suggests that inventors’ moving decisions do not seem 
to be related to their own innovation styles. Overall, the results suggest that while it seems that 
there is some overestimation of firm fixed effects for inventors who move up, endogenous 
moving by inventors does not appear to substantially alter our overall conclusion. 
Third, another concern of our main results is that inventors could endogenously choose to 
move to firms with similar operating performance. In this case, we may underestimate firms’ 
organizational capital and hence overestimate the relative importance of inventors’ human 
capital to firms’ organizational capital. This is because we would attribute little innovation to 
firm fixed effects if inventors only move to firms with similar performance, given that it is less 
likely for us to observe a change in the inventors’ patenting around the moves. However, firms 
could have contributed more to innovation had the inventors moved to the firms with different 
performances. To address this concern, in Panels C and D of Table 11, we divide the sample into 
two groups. The first group contains inventors who move to firms with similar performance. We 
define a similarly performing firm as those that are in the bottom quartile of the difference in 
ROA between the firm and the previous firm. The other group contains inventors who move to 
firms with different performance, which is defined as the firms that are in the top quartile of the 
difference in ROA between the firm and the previous firm.  
The results reported in Panels C and D show that the inventor is 17 times as important as 
the firm in explaining patent counts when they move between firms with similar performance, 
and the inventor is 13 times as important as the firm in explaining patent counts when they move 
between firms with different performance. For citations per patent, exploratory score, and 
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 exploitative score, the inventor is also more important than the firm in terms of the explanatory 
power. The evidence once again suggests that endogenous moving could not completely account 
for our main results.  
 Finally, one remaining concern is that even if inventors move to firms that appear very 
different in terms of operating performance, it is possible that these firms are operationally 
similar, which still causes the firm fixed effect be underestimated. For example, if the firm to 
which an inventor is moving is in a different industry from her previous firm, the new firm is 
more likely to affect her patenting by providing vastly different access to resource and 
environment. In contrast, if the firm to which an inventor is moving is in the same industry as her 
previous firm, the new firm is less likely to affect her patenting. Hence, we are likely to 
underestimate firm fixed effects in the former situation than that in the latter case. To address 
this concern, we classify inventor moving into two groups. One group contains inventors who 
move within the same industry and the other group contains inventors who move across 
industries. Panels E and Panel F of Table 11 repeat the main tests for compare inventors who 
move within the same industry and move across industries, respectively. We find that inventor 
fixed effects are 12 times as important as firm fixed effects in explaining patent counts when 
inventors move across different industries, and are 19 times as important as firm fixed effects in 
explaining patent counts when inventors move within the same industry. In addition, in terms of 
citations per patent, exploitative score, and exploratory score, the inventor also appears to be 
much more important than the firm. As a matter of fact, the ratio of explanatory power of 
inventor fixed effects and firm fixed effects for inventors who move across different industries is 
very close to our baseline findings. Thus, the results suggest that inventors who move within the 
same industry and hence are mostly likely to be subject to endogenous moving have limited 
effect on our results.  
 Overall, the test results in this section suggests that our main findings that individual 
human capital plays a way more important role than firms’ organizational capital in explaining 
innovation performance is not completely driven by inventors’ endogenous moving decisions. 
However, one needs to be cautious in interpreting and generalizing our results because 
endogenous moving by inventors appears to play a role in our findings and we cannot completely 
rule it out.  
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 6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have studied the relative importance of firms’ organizational capital and 
inventors’ human capital in promoting a firm’s innovation output. We decompose the variation 
in innovation output into firm- and inventor-specific components. Inventors’ human capital 
appears to be about 13 times as important as firms’ organizational capital in explaining a firm’s 
innovation performance in terms of patent counts and citations, while inventors’ human capital is 
only about the same as important when explaining the firm’s innovation styles in terms of patent 
exploratory and exploitive scores. In the cross section, inventors contribute more to innovation 
output when they are better networked, are in firms with higher inventor mobility, are in high-
tech industry firms, and are in publicly traded firms. This paper highlights the importance of 
individual inventors in enhancing firm innovation and sheds new light on the theory of the firm. 
We need to bear in mind three caveats when interpreting or generalizing our results. First, 
similar to all other studies that use movements of individuals (e.g., executives, venture capitalists, 
bankers, employees, etc.) as an identification strategy, our empirical setting is subject to the 
concern that inventors’ moving could be endogenous. Our results intend to show the average 
effect of moving across firms on inventors who actually move. We are silent about the reason for 
inventors’ moving, although additional tests suggest that endogenous moving does not alter the 
interpretation of our findings. Second, we are only able to capture the contribution to innovation 
output from movers and stayers in firms with at least one mover. If there is no inventor moving 
in a firm, we would not be able to separate the contribution from the inventors and that from the 
firms. Finally, because innovation is human capital intensive, we are likely to attribute more 
innovation contribution to inventors. Hence, what we find is likely a lower bound of a firm’s 
contribution to investment. 
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 Appendix A 
Details in sample construction 
We match the HBS patent and inventor database with the NBER patent citation database 
following four steps:  
(1) We break all patents in the NBER database into two subsets based on the number of 
assignees each patent has---one subset (hereafter called Subset A) contains all patents owned by 
a single assignee while the other one (called Subset B) includes patents owned by multiple 
assignees.  For inventors whose patents belong to Subset A, their company affiliations can be 
easily identified. We match all patents in Subset A with the HBS database through patent number, 
resulting in a set of 6,270,074 matched inventor-patent instances denoted by Counterpart A.  
(2) We divide the set, Counterpart B, consisting of all unmatched instances after step one 
into two groups: one group referred to as Counterpart B1 that is comprised of inventor-patent 
instances in which each patent is filed by a single inventor; and the other group referred to as 
Counterpart B2 that collects the rest inventor-patent instances in which every patent is 
coauthored by multiple inventors.  We then match all instances in Counterpart B1 with Subset B 
by patent number, which leads to 22,555 inventor-patent-assignee instances corresponding to 
11,461 inventor-patent instances in Counterpart B1 as each patent may be possessed by several 
assignees. We then determine one assignee for each instance based on matched information in 
Counterpart A, i.e., we designate a unique assignee to an inventor in the year that patent granted 
if this assignee coincides with one assignee for which the inventor has been recognized to work 
in Counterpart A in the same year. If we dig out multiple assignees through above method, we 
exploit the location information to pin down the assignee for these instances. Another extreme 
case is that we find no appropriate assignees in Counterpart A through above method, we also 
exploit the location information to help us determine the assignee for these instances. For 
example, if the inventor’s location is Mahwah of New Jersey, the assignee with perfectly 
matched location would be assigned. If several assignees have the same location, we randomly 
choose one. Otherwise, we relax our searching criteria and select the assignee sharing the same 
state, New Jersey and so on so forth. In such way, we can figure out all assignees for the 11,461 
instances.  
(3) For all instances in Counterpart B2, they are patents filed by multiple inventors and 
belonged to various assignees. Through patent number, we join them with Subset B to form all 
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 pairwise combinations and then select one assignee for each inventor-patent instance.  The 
selection procedure is identical to that in step 2. As a result, assignees for the 250,168 inventor-
patent instances in Counterpart B2 can be identified.  
(4) Combing all instances obtained in above three steps, our final matched sample 
consists of 6,531,703 inventor-patent instances whose assignee can be uniquely identified. 
 Then we nail down the company affiliation for each inventor over his/her whole career 
with the assistance of 6,531,703 matched inventor-patent instances. If all patents filed by an 
inventor of a year belong to a single assignee, it can be ascertained that the inventor was hired by 
the assignee in that year with certainty. Another situation often encountered is that patents filed 
by an inventor of one year are owned by different assignees. For instance, two patents of an 
inventor are claimed by assignee A while another five patents belong to assignee B in a year. In 
such case, it’s quite reasonable to assume that the inventor was employed by the assignee to 
which most patents of the inventor belong in that year. Particularly, when the number of patents 
to different assignees breaks even, say an inventor files the same number of patents for both 
assignee A and B in certain year, we utilize the inventor’s employment information of last year 
to help us identify---if he worked for assignee A (B) last year, we presume that he was employed 
by A (B) this year in order to make his career path consistent.11 Otherwise, we randomly pick 
one for him. This procedure brings about 4,251,546 inventor-year observations.  
For our analysis, we augment our inventor-year sample in a chronological order by filling 
all year gaps for inventors who appear in the patent database but do not have patents in the gap 
years. For example, an inventor filed patents in 1986 and 1991. Thus our sample only captures 
the inventor’s performances in 1986 and 1991. We expand the observations between 1986 and 
1991 for him or her by taking the patent counts and patent citations to be zero.12 This method 
comes with a caveat: that how we can accurately identify inventors’ employer in gap years. 
Following above example, it would be quite intuitive and easy for us to decide which company 
the inventor belongs to between 1986 and 1991 if the patents he filed in both years are owned by 
the same company. It would turn to be difficult if the patents filed in 1986 and 1991 belong to 
11 Admittedly, this is an ad hoc assignment. To alleviate this concern, we repeat our analysis after different assigning 
methods. For example, we use the inventor’s employment information in subsequent year, i.e., if the inventor 
worked for assignee A (B) in next year, we assume his employer of this year was A (B). We also tried the method to 
pick an assignee for the inventor randomly. Doing these does not alter the nature of the results.  
12  However, we specify other metrics that evaluate inventors’ innovation style (such as exploratory ratio and 
exploitative ratio elaborated in next subsection) as missing. 
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 distinct companies, say, A and B. In other words, how do we decide the company affiliations of a 
mover for the transition years where we have no observations on his patent filing? We adopt the 
method by assuming that the inventor belongs to the old company A in the first half of his 
transition years (1987 to 1988) and belongs to the new company B in the second half of the 
transition years (1989 to 1990).13 This procedure leads to 7,445,855 inventor-year observations 
in our augmented sample. 
 
  
13 We tried other methods to assign the company affiliation to a mover: (1) assume the inventor belongs to the old 
company A for all the transition years; (2) assume the inventor belongs to the new company B for all the transition 
years. Also, we conducted our analysis in which we excluded all years with no observations on patent filing. The 
results are qualitatively similar across these implementations. 
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 Appendix B 
Definition of variables       
Variable Definition 
Measures of innovation 
LnPatentt+3 Natural logarithm of one plus inventor i’s total number of patents filed (and 
eventually granted) in year t+3;  
LnCitePatt+3 Natural logarithm of one plus inventor i’s total number of citations received 
on the inventor’s patents filed (and eventually granted), scaled by the 
number of the patents filed (and eventually granted)  in year t+3;  
Exploitt+3 The number of exploitative patents filed (and eventually granted) divided by 
the number of all patents filed (and eventually granted) by the inventor in 
year t+3; a patent is classified as exploitative if at least 60% of its citations 
are based on existing knowledge; 
Exploret+3 The number of exploratory patents filed (and eventually granted) divided by 
the number of all patents filed (and eventually granted) by the firm in year 
t+3; a patent is classified as exploratory if at least 60% of its citations are 
based on new knowledge; 
Measures of control variables  
LnExpnumt+3 Natural logarithm of one plus inventor i’s average number of patents filed 
(and eventually granted) per year in the three years prior to year t+3; 
LnExpcitt+3 Natural logarithm of one plus inventor i’s average number of scaled 
citations received on the inventor’s patents filed (and eventually granted) in 
three years prior to year t+3; 
Assetst Book value of total assets (#6) measured at the end of fiscal year t; 
R&DAssetst Research and development expenditures (#46) divided by book value of 
total assets (#6) measured at the end of fiscal year t, set to 0 if missing; 
Aget Firm i's age, approximated by the number of years the firm has been listed 
on Compustat; 
ROAt Return-on-assets ratio defined as operating income before depreciation 
(#13) divided by book value of total assets (#6), measured at the end of 
fiscal year t; 
PPEAssetst Property, Plant & Equipment (net, #8) divided by book value of total assets 
(#6) measured at the end of fiscal year t; 
Leveraget Firm i’s leverage ratio, defined as book value of debt (#9 + #34) divided by 
book value of total assets (#6) measured at the end of fiscal year t; 
CapexAssetst Capital expenditure (#128) scaled by book value of total assets (#6) 
measured at the end of fiscal year t; 
TobinQt Firm i's market-to-book ratio during fiscal year t, calculated as [market 
value of equity (#199 × #25) plus book value of assets (#6) minus book 
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 value of equity (#60) minus balance sheet deferred taxes (#74, set to 0 if 
missing)] divided by book value of assets (#6); 
KZindext Firm i's KZ index measured at the end of fiscal year t, calculated as -1.002 × 
Cash Flow ((#18+#14)/#8) plus 0.283 × Q ((#6+#199×#25-#60-#74)/#6) 
plus 3.189  × Leverage ((#9+#34)/(#9+#34+#216)) minus 39.368 × 
Dividends ((#21+#19)/#8) minus 1.315 × Cash holdings(#1/#8), where #8 is 
lagged; 
Hindext Herfindahl index of 4-digit SIC industry j where firm i belongs, measured at 
the end of fiscal year t. 
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Panel C                                                               Panel D 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of estimated inventor fixed effects: connectedness sample. This figure 
displays the distribution of estimated inventor fixed effects from the AKM regression in the 
connectedness sample with four different dependent variables: the log of one plus the adjusted 
number of patents (Panel A), the log of one plus the adjusted number of patent citations (Panel 
B), the Exploit index (Panel C), and Explore (Panel D). In the graph, the estimates are 
normalized so the mean value of the inventor fixed effects is zero.  
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Panel C                                                               Panel D 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of estimated inventor fixed effects: largest group of the connected sample. 
This figure displays the distribution of estimated inventor fixed effects from the AKM regression 
in the largest connected sample with four different dependent variables: the log of one plus the 
adjusted number of patents (Panel A), the log of one plus the adjusted number of patent citations 
(Panel B), the Exploit index (Panel C), and Explore (Panel D). In the graph, the estimates are 
normalized so the mean value of the inventor fixed effects is zero.  
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 Table 1: Inventor mobility characteristics—full sample  
This table reports the mobility structure of our full sample from 1970 to 2006. A mover is 
defined as the inventor who switches working firms. Panel A presents the employment 
information of inventors in our sample. Panel B presents the distribution of movers across firms. 
 
Panel A: Number of mover out of all inventors 
 
Mover No. of firms in which 
inventors are employed 
No. of inventors Percentage 
No 1 172,117 84.09 
 Subtotal 172,117 84.09 
 
 
Yes 
2 28,159 13.76 
3 3,776 1.84 
4 552 0.27 
5 65 0.03 
6 7 0.00 
7 2 0.00 
 Subtotal 32,561 15.91 
 Total 204,678 100.00 
 
 
Panel B: Number of movers per firm 
 
Mover Per Firm Frequency Percentage Cum. 
0 1,412 24.68 24.68 
1-5 1,719 30.04 54.72 
6-10 734 12.83 67.55 
11-20 610 10.66 78.21 
21-30 274 4.79 83.00 
31-50 268 4.68 87.68 
51-100 253 4.42 92.10 
>100 452 7.90 100.00 
Total 5,722 100.00  
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 Table 2: Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for the full sample and the connectedness sample in 
inventor and firm level when using patent counts and citations as dependent variables in our 
baseline regression. Panel A presents the summary statistics of patent counts and citations as 
well as the time-varying inventor characteristics measures for inventor-year observations. Panel 
B presents the summary statistics of the time-varying firm characteristics measures for firm-year 
observations. Definitions of variables are listed in the table of our appendix. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics for inventors 
 
Variable Mean Median SD 25th  75th  N (inventor-year) 
Patent       
Full Sample 0.965 0.000 2.100 0.000 1.000 1,250,041 
Connectedness Sample 0.967 0.000 2.105 0.000 1.000 1,239,614 
Citation        
Full Sample 6.899 0.000 17.020 0.000 7.456 1,250,041 
Connectedness Sample 6.914 0.000 17.044 0.000 7.472 1,239,614 
Expnum       
Full Sample 0.850 0.333 1.643 0.000 1.000 1,250,041 
Connectedness Sample 0.852 0.333 1.648 0.000 1.000 1,239,614 
Expcit       
Full Sample 7.186 2.927 12.713 0.000 9.121 1,250,041 
Connectedness Sample 7.199 2.939 12.717 0.000 9.146 1,239,614 
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 Panel B: Summary statistics for firms 
 
Variable Mean Median SD 25th  75th  N (firm-year) 
Assets (million)       
Full Sample 7120.888 691.710 21416.620 110.870 4084.982 46,177 
Connectedness Sample 7569.452 844.164 22253.390 137.228 4512.000 40,047 
RDAssets       
Full Sample 0.059 0.032 0.143 0.010 0.068 46,177 
Connectedness Sample 0.060 0.035 0.140 0.012 0.069 40,047 
Age       
Full Sample 21.932 21.000 13.151 10.000 32.000 46,177 
Connectedness Sample 22.386 22.000 13.305 11.000 33.000 40,047 
ROA       
Full Sample 0.115 0.143 0.268 0.090 0.195 46,177 
Connectedness Sample 0.121 0.145 0.254 0.093 0.197 40,047 
PPEAssets       
Full Sample 0.298 0.269 0.161 0.189 0.377 46,177 
Connectedness Sample 0.299 0.271 0.158 0.193 0.377 40,047 
Leverage       
Full Sample 0.222 0.209 0.176 0.101 0.309 46,177 
Connectedness Sample 0.220 0.208 0.173 0.103 0.304 40,047 
CapexAssets       
Full Sample 0.068 0.059 0.047 0.038 0.085 46,177 
Connectedness Sample 0.069 0.060 0.046 0.039 0.086 40,047 
TobinQ       
Full Sample 1.940 1.317 2.635 1.021 1.967 46,177 
Connectedness Sample 1.942 1.339 2.463 1.034 2.005 40,047 
KZindex       
Full Sample -5.429 -1.656 88.358 -4.482 -0.065 46,177 
Connectedness Sample -4.997 -1.714 52.882 -4.518 -0.129 40,047 
Hindex       
Full Sample 0.263 0.213 0.187 0.128 0.345 46,177 
Connectedness Sample 0.264 0.214 0.187 0.127 0.348 40,047 
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 Table 3: Inventor and firm fixed effects—Connectedness sample regressions 
This table reports three-way fixed effects regressions using the method in Abowd, Kramarz and 
Margolis (1999) and Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz (2002) to estimate both inventor and firm 
fixed effects in the connectedness sample. The estimation is implemented by using the Stata 
command “felsdvreg” proposed by Cornelissen (2008). Column 1 uses the natural logarithm of 
one plus the adjusted number of patents as the dependent variable and column 2 uses the natural 
logarithm of one plus the adjusted number of patent citations as the dependent variable (zero if 
no patents filed by an inventor of a year). Columns 3 and 4 use the Exploit and Explore scores as 
the dependent variables (missing value is assigned if no patents filed by an inventor of a year). 
The rows for “Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects” report the inventor and 
firm fixed effects in explaining the total variation in the connectedness sample. The percentages 
in parentheses present the fraction of model R-square explained by each set of variables (see 
Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012), Ewens and Rhodes-Kropf (2015) for details). The row for “Inv. FE 
/ Firm FE” calculates the ratio of the contribution of inventor fixed effects to the contribution of 
firm fixed effects in explaining the total variation. The rows for “F-test on Fixed Effects” report 
the F-statistics for the joint significance of both fixed effects and respective significance of 
inventor and firm fixed effects. For each column, the rows for “Adj. R-sq.” report three 
regressions with different set of independent variables. The first row reports adjusted 𝑅𝑅2 for the 
regression including all time-varying control variables. The second row reports adjusted 𝑅𝑅2 for 
the regression including all control variables and firm fixed effects. The third row reports 
adjusted 𝑅𝑅2 for the regression including all control variables and inventor fixed effects. The last 
row reports adjusted 𝑅𝑅2  for the AKM estimation. Definitions of variables are defined in 
Appendix B. “# Firms” is the total firms in our sample. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 
1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.311 (67.76%) 0.300 (90.36%) 0.340 (56.95%) 0.326 (51.34%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.024 (5.45%) 0.021 (6.33%) 0.236 (39.53%) 0.245 (38.58%) 
Inv. FE / Firm FE 12.958 14.286 1.441 1.331 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.63*** 1.61*** 2.54*** 2.79*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.59*** 1.54*** 1.31*** 1.37*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 1.65*** 1.59*** 3.83*** 5.22*** 
Observation 1,239,614 1,239,614 548,233 548,233 
 
Adj. R-sq. after the Addition of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects 
Control Variables 0.283 0.118 0.074 0.113 
Adding Firm FE 0.288 0.128 0.328 0.379 
Adding Inventor FE 0.349 0.197 0.376 0.427 
Adding Both FE 0.351 0.199 0.391 0.448 
# Movers 32,561 32,561 21,139 21,139 
# Stayers 168,900 168,900 161,940 161,940 
# Firms 4,310 4,310 3,249 3,249 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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 Table 4: Different samples 
This table reports robust check results using the MDV method detailed in Bertrand and Schoar 
(2003) to estimate both inventor and firm fixed effects in the mobility sample (Panel A) and 
results using the AKM method to estimate both inventor and firm fixed effects in the largest 
group of connected sample (Panel B). In both panels, column 1 uses the natural logarithm of one 
plus the adjusted number of patents as the dependent variable and column 2 uses the natural 
logarithm of one plus the adjusted number of patent citations as the dependent variable (zero if 
no patents filed by an inventor of a year). Columns 3 and 4 use the Exploit and Explore scores as 
the dependent variables (missing value is assigned if no patents filed by an inventor of a year). 
Definitions of variables are defined in the table of appendix. In Panel A, “# Person” reports the 
number of movers since only movers are included in the mobility sample. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Inventor and firm fixed effects based on the mobility sample 
 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.254 (59.62%) 0.226 (79.58%) 0.190 (41.21%) 0.179 (35.52%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.033 (7.75%) 0.032 (11.27%) 0.257 (55.75%) 0.247 (49.01%) 
Inv. FE / Firm FE 7.697 7.063 0.739 0.725 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.89*** 1.73*** 2.80*** 2.94*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.89*** 1.67*** 1.24*** 1.30*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 1.45*** 1.43*** 4.99*** 5.49*** 
Observation 323,381 323,381 113,072 113,072 
 
Adj. R-sq. after the Addition of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects 
Control Variables 0.287 0.125 0.048 0.104 
Adding Firm FE 0.293 0.137 0.281 0.332 
Adding Inventor FE 0.348 0.187 0.219 0.271 
Adding Both FE 0.352 0.192 0.313 0.368 
# Persons (#Movers) 32,561 32,561 21,139 21,139 
# Firms 4,310 4,310 3,249 3,249 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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 Panel B: Inventor and firm fixed effects based on the largest group 
 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.310 (67.69%) 0.300 (90.36%) 0.340 (56.86%) 0.325 (51.26%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.025 (5.46%) 0.021 (6.33%) 0.237 (39.63%) 0.245 (38.64%) 
Inv. FE / Firm FE 12.400 14.286 1.435 1.327 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.63*** 1.61*** 2.54*** 2.79*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.59*** 1.54*** 1.31*** 1.37*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 1.68*** 1.61*** 3.93*** 5.28*** 
Observation 1,237,555 1,237,555 546,829 546,829 
Adj. R-sq. 0.351 0.199 0.391 0.448 
# Movers 32,450 32,450 20,997 20,997 
# Stayers 168,566 168,566 161,392 161,392 
# Firms 4,130 4,130 3,055 3,055 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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 Table 5: Distribution of retrieved inventor fixed effects 
This table tabulates distributions of retrieved inventor fixed effects from the AKM regressions 
using four different dependent variables in both the connectedness sample (Panel A) and the 
largest group of connected sample (Panel B). The estimates are normalized so the mean value of 
the inventor fixed effects is zero. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics of inventor fixed effects in the connectedness sample 
 
Dep. Variable Median SD 25th  75th  Number of Inventors 
LnPatent -0.052 0.361 -0.245 0.200 201,461 
LnCitePat -0.138 0.947 -0.687 0.556 201,461 
Exploit -0.029 0.211 -0.090 0.025 183,079 
Explore 0.047 0.279 -0.108 0.147 183,079 
 
 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics of inventor fixed effects in the largest group 
 
Dep. Variable Median SD 25th  75th  Number of Inventors 
      
LnPatent -0.052 0.361 -0.245 0.200 201,016 
LnCitePat -0.138 0.947 -0.687 0.556 201,016 
Exploit -0.029 0.210 -0.090 0.025 182,389 
Explore 0.047 0.279 -0.108 0.147 182,389 
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 Table 6: Subsample of firms with high centrality 
This table reports the subsample analysis results using the AKM method to estimate both 
inventor and firm fixed effects in a subsample of firms with high centrality. We define the 
centrality of firm based on their employers’ degree of centrality. From 1970 to 2003, we 
calculate inventors’ normalized degree centrality of a year, which is equal to the number of 
coauthor relationships of past three years an inventor has in the network divided by the 
maximum possible coauthor relationships of past three years he or she could have in an n-
inventor network (Refer to Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) for more detail on the 
methodology). In each year, we define an inventor who is in the top 10% of normalized degree 
centrality as a “key” inventor of the firm. Then across our sample period, we compute the 
average number of “key” inventors per year for all firms and select those connected firms that 
are in the top 10% in terms of the average number of “key” inventors, which gives us a 
subsample of firms with high centrality. The estimation is implemented by using the Stata 
command “felsdvreg” proposed by Cornelissen (2008). Column 1 uses the natural logarithm of 
one plus the adjusted number of patents as the dependent variable and column 2 uses the natural 
logarithm of one plus the adjusted number of patent citations as the dependent variable (zero if 
no patents filed by an inventor of a year). Columns 3 and 4 use the Exploit and Explore scores as 
the dependent variables (missing value is assigned if no patents filed by an inventor of a year). 
Definitions of variables are defined in the table of appendix. ***, ** and * indicate significance 
at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.315 (68.18%) 0.303 (91.54%) 0.346 (58.05%) 0.327 (51.58%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.020 (4.33%) 0.014 (4.23%) 0.230 (38.59%) 0.245 (38.64%) 
Inv. FE / Firm FE 15.750 21.643 1.504 1.335 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.70*** 1.60*** 2.67*** 2.96*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.66*** 1.54*** 1.39*** 1.43*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 4.86*** 3.24*** 17.86*** 21.48*** 
Observation 1,032,675 1,032,675 452,755 452,755 
Adj. R-sq. 0.358 0.202 0.402 0.459 
# Movers 17,688 17,688 11,037 11,037 
# Stayers 149,209 149,209 135,046 135,046 
# Firms 424 424 320 320 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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 Table 7: Subsample of firms with high mobility 
This table reports the subsample analysis results using the AKM method to estimate both 
inventor and firm fixed effects in a subsample of firms with high mobility. The subsample of 
firms with high mobility includes only the set of connected firms in top 20% (actually these 
firms receive same scores regarding mobility) of mobility which is equal to the ratio of the total 
number of movers a firm has to the total number of inventors of that firm. The estimation is 
implemented by using the Stata command “felsdvreg” proposed by Cornelissen (2008). Column 
1 uses the natural logarithm of one plus the adjusted number of patents as the dependent variable 
and column 2 uses the natural logarithm of one plus the adjusted number of patent citations as 
the dependent variable (zero if no patents filed by an inventor of a year). Columns 3 and 4 
exploit the Exploit and Explore indices as the dependent variables (missing value is assigned if 
no patents filed by an inventor of a year). Definitions of variables are defined in the table of 
appendix. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.334 (72.29%) 0.348 (98.31%) 0.370 (62.93%) 0.365 (57.48%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.018 (3.90%) 0.004 (1.13%) 0.182 (30.95%) 0.156 (24.57%) 
Inv. FE / Firm FE 18.556 87.000 2.033 2.340 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.47*** 1.44*** 1.63*** 1.68*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.44*** 1.37*** 0.94 1.12*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 1.51*** 1.77*** 5.73*** 5.97*** 
Observation 99,885 99,885 42,289 42,289 
Adj.R-sq. 0.316 0.175 0.282 0.363 
# Movers 3,699 3,699 2,715 2,715 
# Stayers 16,992 16,992 14,896 14,896 
# Firms 556 556 433 433 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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 Table 8: Subsample of high-tech firms 
This table reports the subsample analysis results using the AKM method to estimate both 
inventor and firm fixed effects in a subsample of high-tech firms. The subsample of high-tech 
firms considers only the set of firms in “Drug & Chemical” category that includes industries 
mainly producing patents on drugs, medical instrumentation, and chemicals or in “Computer & 
Electrical” category that includes industries mainly producing patents on computers, 
communications technologies, and electrical technologies (See Tian and Wang (2014) for 
details). The estimation is implemented by using the Stata command “felsdvreg” proposed by 
Cornelissen (2008). Column 1 uses the natural logarithm of one plus the adjusted number of 
patents as the dependent variable and column 2 uses the natural logarithm of one plus the 
adjusted number of patent citations as the dependent variable (zero if no patents filed by an 
inventor of a year). Columns 3 and 4 exploit the Exploit and Explore indices as the dependent 
variables (missing value is assigned if no patents filed by an inventor of a year). Definitions of 
variables are defined in the table of appendix. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 
10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.323 (70.07%) 0.308 (92.22%) 0.360 (59.90%) 0.343 (54.53%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.021 (4.56%) 0.020 (5.99%) 0.224 (37.27%) 0.210 (33.39%) 
Inv. FE / Firm FE 15.381 15.400 1.607 1.633 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.59*** 1.58*** 2.70*** 2.79*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.56*** 1.52*** 1.29*** 1.37*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 1.76*** 1.65*** 4.00*** 4.62*** 
Observation 874,399 874,399 403,168 403,168 
Adj.R-sq. 0.351 0.199 0.401 0.444 
# Movers 19,815 19,815 13,555 13,555 
# Stayers 126,042 126,042 118,602 118,602 
# Firms 2,556 2,556 1,996 1,996 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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 Table 9: Public firms vs. private firms 
This table reports the subsample analysis results using the AKM method to estimate both inventor and firm fixed effects in a sample 
including both public and private firms beginning from 1970 to 2003. Private firms are those firms unmatched with Compustat Annual 
Data while public firms are identical to those appeared in our baseline regressions.  The estimation is implemented by using the Stata 
command “reghdfe” proposed by Correia (2014). In our regressions, all time-varying firm characteristics are dropped as private firms 
have no financial data, whereas time-varying inventor characteristics (Prior Innovation Experience) are included. Each column 
corresponds to two sets of regression using different samples: one regresses on the pooled sample while the other one regresses on 
only the sample of private firms. Column 1 uses the natural logarithm of one plus the adjusted number of patents as the dependent 
variable and column 2 uses the log of one plus the adjusted number of patent citations as the dependent variable (zero if no patents 
filed by an inventor of a year). Columns 3 and 4 exploit the Exploit and Explore indices as the dependent variables (missing value is 
assigned if no patents filed by an inventor of a year). Definitions of variables are defined in the table of appendix. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample Pooled Private Pooled Private Pooled Private Pooled Private 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. 
FE 
0.260 
(62.65%) 
0.276 
(66.03%) 
0.250 
(84.18%) 
0.267 
(83.44%) 
0.260 
(54.28%) 
0.280 
(61.54%) 
0.260 
(50.88%) 
0.292 
(58.99%) 
Contribution of Firm 
FE 
0.028 
(6.75%) 
0.037 
(8.85%) 
0.038 
(12.79%) 
0.050 
(15.63%) 
0.195 
(40.71%) 
0.147 
(32.31%) 
0.205 
(40.12%) 
0.161 
(32.53%) 
Inv. FE / Firm FE 9.286 7.459 6.579 5.340 1.333 1.905 1.268 1.814 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.65*** 1.60*** 1.67*** 1.63*** 2.64*** 1.98*** 2.87*** 2.29*** 
Observation 3,624,251 2,071,875 3,624,251 2,071,875 1,302,755 661,081 1,302,755 661,081 
Adj.R-sq. 0.323 0.307 0.187 0.184 0.307 0.239 0.349 0.295 
# Inventors 431,903 280,001 431,903 280,001 293,754 165,926 293,754 165,926 
# Firms 63,501 51,454 63,501 51,454 29,420 213,29 29,420 213,29 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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 Table 10: Characteristics of firms and inventors 
This table reports characteristics of firms that movers left and moved to, inventors that move and 
stay, and firms in and out of the sample. A mover is an inventor that switched firms during the 
sample period. Numbers reported are the mean across each subsample. Column 3 reports the 
differences in mean and their significance between the two samples. Panel A reports the 
differences of characteristics between firms which inventors move to and firms which inventors 
move from. “Moved To” comprises firms that only had a mover move to that firm. “Moved 
From” comprises firms that only had a mover leave the firm. Panel B reports the characteristics 
of inventors who move and stay in the full fixed effects regressions. “Movers” comprises 
inventors that moved at least once. “Stayers” comprises inventors that in the connected sample. 
Definitions of variables are defined in the table of appendix. ***, ** and * indicate significance 
at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Firms from and to which inventors move 
 Moving To Moving From Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Assets 24,230.940 27,078.200 -2,847.255*** 
RDAssets 0.064 0.057 0.007*** 
ROA 0.142 0.151 -0.009*** 
Leverage 0.214 0.230 -0.016*** 
PPEAssets 0.282 0.313 -0.031*** 
CapexAssets 0.070 0.077 -0.007*** 
TobinQ 2.054 1.665 0.389*** 
Founded Year 1970 1962 8.000*** 
Observation 3,615 2,384  
 
Panel B: Stayers vs. movers 
 Movers Stayers Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Patent 0.937 1.026 -0.089*** 
Citation 6.861 7.173 -0.312*** 
Exploit 0.072 0.114 -0.042*** 
Explore 0.812 0.757 0.055*** 
Observation 32,513 168,772  
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 Table 11: Movers and firm performance  
This table reports the subsample analysis results using the AKM method to estimate both 
inventor and firm fixed effects in subsamples containing different types of movers. The 
subsample of movers that move down starts with movers whose new firm’s operating 
performance (defined as the average ROA of the firm in past three years) was higher than their 
previous firm’s operating performance. The subset of movers that move up starts with movers 
whose new firm’s operating performance was lower than their previous firm’s operating 
performance. The subsample of movers that move to firms with similar operating performance 
considers the movers who moved to a firm that was in the bottom quartile of the difference 
between new versus previous firm performance. The subsample of movers that move to firms 
with difference operating performance considers the movers who moved to a firm that was in the 
top quartile of the difference between new versus previous firm performance. The different 
industry subsample considers movers who move across different industries. The same industry 
subsample considers movers who move within the same industries. Industry is defined based on 
3-digit SIC codes. Panel A - F correspond to the estimation with six different subsamples 
described above. The connected group is constructed after restricting to this set of movers. If a 
mover moves more than once, it is excluded from the subsamples. The estimation is 
implemented by using the Stata command “felsdvreg” proposed by Cornelissen (2008). Column 
1 uses the natural logarithm of one plus the adjusted number of patents as the dependent variable 
and column 2 uses the natural logarithm of one plus the adjusted number of patent citations as 
the dependent variable (zero if no patents filed by an inventor of a year). Columns 3 and 4 
exploit the Exploit and Explore indices as the dependent variables (missing value is assigned if 
no patents filed by an inventor of a year). Definitions of variables are defined in the table of 
appendix. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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 Panel A: Moving down movers 
 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.336 (72.10%) 0.325 (94.48%) 0.355 (58.20%) 0.337 (51.77%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.011 (2.36%) 0.011 
(3.20%) 
0.230 (37.70%) 0.250 (38.40%) 
Inv. FE / Firm FE 30.545 29.545 1.543 1.348 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.60*** 1.60*** 2.43*** 2.74*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.57*** 1.54*** 1.29*** 1.37*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 1.33*** 1.22*** 2.58*** 3.49*** 
Observation 993,469 993,469 437,588 437,588 
Adj.R-sq. 0.352 0.203 0.394 0.457 
# Movers 10,495 10,495 6,126 6,126 
# Stayers 163,182 163,182 148,290 148,290 
# Firms 2,327 2,327 1,626 1,626 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Panel B: Moving up movers 
 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.318 (68.53%) 0.313 (91.79%) 0.361 (58.97%) 0.333 (51.00%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.027 (5.82%) 0.021 
(6.16%) 
0.225 (36.76%) 0.255 (39.05%) 
Inv. FE / Firm FE 11.778 14.905 1.604 1.306 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.60*** 1.60*** 2.44*** 2.76*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.57*** 1.54*** 1.29*** 1.38*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 1.27*** 1.15*** 2.28*** 3.30*** 
Observation 1,003,488 1,003,488 442,299 442,299 
Adj.R-sq. 0.350 0.200 0.397 0.461 
# Movers 11,253 11,253 6,329 6,329 
# Stayers 163,406 163,406 149,922 149,922 
# Firms 2,374 2,374 1,615 1,615 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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 Panel C: Movers that move to firms with similar operating performance  
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.326 (70.41%) 0.324 (94.74%) 0.458 (75.21%) 0.363 (55.76%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.019 (4.10%) 0.011 
(3.22%) 
0.127 (20.85%) 0.229 (35.18%) 
Inv. FE / Firm FE 17.158 29.455 3.606 1.585 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.60*** 1.61*** 2.50*** 2.85*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.57*** 1.55*** 1.33*** 1.39*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 1.32*** 1.07* 2.30*** 3.44*** 
Observation 890,536 890,536 387,697 387,697 
Adj.R-sq. 0.350 0.203 0.398 0.464 
# Movers 5,438 5,438 3,499 3,499 
# Stayers 148,813 148,813 131,195 131,195 
# Firms 1,256 1,256 889 889 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Panel D: Movers that move to firms with different operating performance  
 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.323 (69.02%) 0.313 (90.72%) 0.334 (54.75%) 0.314 (48.09%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.024 (5.13%) 0.024 
(6.96%) 
0.250 (40.98%) 0.275 (42.11%) 
Inv. FE / Firm FE 13.458 13.042 1.336 1.142 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.59*** 1.59*** 2.41*** 2.75*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.56*** 1.53*** 1.29*** 1.38*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 1.35*** 1.24*** 1.87*** 2.82*** 
Observation 932,567 932,567 409,651 409,651 
Adj.R-sq. 0.352 0.202 0.396 0.461 
# Movers 5,437 5,437 2,942 2,942 
# Stayers 159,493 159,493 141,442 141,442 
# Firms 1,811 1,811 1,196 1,196 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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 Panel E: Movers that move across different industries 
 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.317 (68.17%) 0.310 (90.91%) 0.349 (57.50%) 0.335 (51.54%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.027 (5.81%) 0.023 
(6.74%) 
0.233 (38.39%) 0.251 (38.62%) 
Inv. FE / Firm FE 11.741 13.478 1.498 1.335 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.61*** 1.59*** 2.37*** 2.69*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.57*** 1.54*** 1.27*** 1.36*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 1.37*** 1.40*** 2.46*** 3.51*** 
Observation 1,040,844 1,040,844 453,490 453,490 
Adj.R-sq. 0.351 0.201 0.389 0.455 
# Movers 14,510 14,510 7,476 7,476 
# Stayers 165,647 165,647 152,932 152,932 
# Firms 2,994 2,994 1,900 1,900 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
Panel F: Movers that move within the same industry 
 
Dependent Variable LnPatent LnCitePat Exploit Explore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Importance of Inventor and Firm Fixed Effects (Percentage of R-sq. Explained) 
Contribution of Inv. FE 0.329 (70.75%) 0.318 (92.98%) 0.447 (72.45%) 0.455 (69.79%) 
Contribution of Firm FE 0.017 (3.66%) 0.019 
(5.56%) 
0.144 (23.34%) 0.132 (20.25%) 
Inv. FE / Firm FE 19.353 16.737 3.104 3.447 
 
F-test on Fixed Effects 
Joint F-statistic 1.61*** 1.61*** 2.52*** 2.77*** 
Inventor FE F-statistic 1.57*** 1.54*** 1.32*** 1.38*** 
Firm FE F-statistic 1.47*** 1.32*** 2.99*** 3.97*** 
Observation 960,567 960,567 412,590 412,590 
Adj.R-sq. 0.351 0.201 0.405 0.460 
# Movers 11,127 11,127 7,034 7,034 
# Stayers 156,127 156,127 138,264 138,264 
# Firms 2,103 2,103 1,530 1,530 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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